Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals in a General Equilibrium Model
29 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2008
Date Written: June 2008
This paper contributes to the discussion on Separate Accounting versus Formula Apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The innovation of the analysis is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenously determined world interest rate. Under the principle of Separate Accounting, it turns out that corporate tax rates may be inefficiently low or high, while under Formula Apportionment corporate tax rates are always inefficiently low. These results are true independent of whether the number of countries is small or large. They reverse the insights obtained by previous studies under the assumption of an exogenously given world interest rate.
Keywords: corporate income tax, Separate Accounting, Formula Apportionment
JEL Classification: H7, H73
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