Supreme Court Amicus Brief Regarding Wyeth V. Diana Levine

28 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2008 Last revised: 27 Nov 2012

See all articles by John Calfee

John Calfee

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Ernst R. Berndt

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert W. Hahn

Technology Policy Institute; University of Oxford, Smith School

Tomas Philipson

University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Paul H. Rubin

Emory University - Department of Economics

W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt University - Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Date Written: June 2008

Abstract

Prominent in arguments opposing preemption of state tort law liability for alleged inadequacies in prescription drug labeling is the argument that such liability can complement FDA regulation by improving on a regulatory scheme that fails to provide adequate deterrence against the marketing of unsafe or inadequately labeled drugs. The premise of this argument is faulty. Fundamental principles of economics and numerous studies of FDA drug regulation reveal that FDA in fact errs on the side of overregulation of prescription drugs. Product liability litigation focused solely on one side of the prescription drug public health equation leads to further distortions of the drug approval and labeling process and exacerbates FDA's inherent overly cautious approach. Preemption of state tort law where it conflicts with FDA requirements will minimize these distortions and thereby maximize public health.

Suggested Citation

Calfee, John and Berndt, Ernst R. and Hahn, Robert W. and Philipson, Tomas J. and Rubin, Paul H. and Viscusi, W. Kip, Supreme Court Amicus Brief Regarding Wyeth V. Diana Levine (June 2008). Reg-Markets Center Brief No. 08-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1142997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1142997

John Calfee (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Ernst R. Berndt

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

Room E52-452
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2665 (Phone)
617-258-6055 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Robert W. Hahn

Technology Policy Institute ( email )

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University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )

Oxford
United Kingdom

Tomas J. Philipson

University of Chicago ( email )

Graduate School of Business
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60637

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Paul H. Rubin

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Sarasota, FL 34236
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HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.emory.edu/Rubi.htm

W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7715 (Phone)
615-322-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/?pid=w-kip-viscusi

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://as.vanderbilt.edu/economics/bio/wkip-viscusi/

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://business.vanderbilt.edu/bio/w-kip-viscusi/

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Nashville, TN 37203
United States