THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, Mark White, ed., Cambridge, 2009
37 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2008 Last revised: 27 Oct 2008
Date Written: 2008
Pluralism is an appealing and now orthodox view of the sources of value. But pluralism has led to well-known difficulties for social-choice theory. Moreover, as Susan Hurley has argued, the difficulties of pluralism go even deeper. In 1954, Kenneth May suggested an intrapersonal analogue to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. In brief, May showed that an individual's response to a plurality of values will, given certain additional assumptions, lead to intransitive preference orderings. (Daniel Kahneman and others have shown that intransitivity is an empirical feature of preferences.) Hurley challenged May's additional assumptions as implausibly strong; but her work did not exclude the possibility that values may disobey the canon of rationality that insists on transitivity. John Broome has recently extended these canons to the "betterness" relation. This chapter argues that there is no good reason to be confident that values, understood as real features of the world, behave consistently with those canons.
Keywords: value pluralism, pluralism, intransitivity, transitivity, rationality
JEL Classification: A13, B4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Edmundson, William A., Pluralism, Intransitivity, Incoherence (2008). ; Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1143541