Review of Network Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 272-293, June 2008
22 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2008 Last revised: 1 Sep 2016
Date Written: June 10, 2008
This paper studies the price structure in a postal sector with a monopolistic operator when customers can engage in worksharing. It presents simulation results obtained from an empirical model that is calibrated on data from the French postal sector. The optimal worksharing discount is significantly larger than the avoided costs. Consequently, the appropriate pricing structure differs markedly from the often recommended ECPR policy.
Keywords: Postal sector, Worksharing, Calibration
JEL Classification: L51, L87, L32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Billette de Villemeur, Etienne and Cremer, Helmuth and Boldron, Francois and Roy, Bernard, Worksharing: A Calibrated Model (June 10, 2008). Review of Network Economics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 272-293, June 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1143546