What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate Solution?

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 967-982, 2008

University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-05

16 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2008 Last revised: 25 Feb 2009

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2008

Abstract

This article responds to Florian Becker's article in the Journal of Competition Law and Economics, "The Case of Export Cartel Exemptions: Between Competition and Protectionism." Professor Becker provides a number of insights into various approaches that battling export cartels may take. I take issue with three of Becker's main themes. First, Becker underplays the importance of political economy issues in the creation and perpetuation of export cartel exceptions from antitrust. A public choice understanding of export cartels is critical to formulating any effective remedy for export cartels. Second, Becker assumes that export cartels are hard-core cartels and that they are a serious problem in international antitrust. In fact, there is very little empirical data on export cartels and nearly all of it comes from the United States. Therefore, it is difficult to say with any great certainty whether export cartels are a problem and how serious a problem they are. Third, Becker ignores the role that international organizations such as the OECD and ICN can play to reduce the effects of export cartels. After surveying different possible solutions, I propose a WTO transparency regime to more effectively address export cartels.

Keywords: cartels, export cartel, antitrust, competition policy, international trade, WTO, ICN, OECD

JEL Classification: F1, F13, K21, K33, L40, L43

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate Solution? (August 1, 2008). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 967-982, 2008; University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1144003

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )

200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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