Trade and Threat Perception

Abstract

Liberal theorists have long held that the value of trade lost due to military conflict will lead states to avoid such conflict with their trading partners. Previous research has found support for this line of argument, but has focused on state behavior rather than the attitudes of those actually engaged in trade. At the individual level, however, it is not obvious that trade actually influences attitudes on security issues in the way liberals argue. Economic interests are rarely considered in research on assessments of political-military threats. Moreover, because trade creates domestic losers as well as winners, it might actually increase threat perception among those whom it negatively affects. This paper tests these arguments in the case of American trade with China using data from both a survey of the general public and roll-call voting in the House of Representatives. As liberals expect, we find evidence that trade indeed influences American attitudes toward China. However, there are substantial differences among individual survey respondents based on whether their income can be expected to rise or fall as the trading relationship grows. The winners have more positive attitudes toward China and express less support for aggressive foreign policies toward the country than do the losers. Aggregate differences along these same dimensions among their constituents also influence roll-call voting in the House of Representatives.

Keywords: trade, threat perception, China, pulbic opinion, congressional roll-call voting