The Chicago School, Transaction Cost Economics and the Roberts Court's Antitrust Jurisprudence

THE ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS, Peter G. Klein, Michael E. Sykuta, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-33

27 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2008 Last revised: 5 Nov 2009

Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: June 12, 2008

Abstract

The Roberts Court's reign at the United States Supreme Court is only in its nascent stages. Already, however, its antitrust activity level has far exceeded the Court's single case average prior to the 2003-04 Term by a significant margin. The recent flurry of antitrust activity and the likely significance the Roberts Court will have on the development of antitrust jurisprudence warrants some reflection and analysis. I argue that the Roberts Court decisions embrace the Chicago School of antitrust analysis, Transaction Cost Economics, and insights from comparative institutional analysis gleaned from New Institutional Economics. Despite the rise of Post-Chicago Economics in economics departments and elite journals, the substance of the Roberts Court's antitrust jurisprudence suggests a significant amount of skepticism is appropriate concerning any prediction of the demise of the Chicago School or Transaction Cost Economics in antitrust in the coming years.

Keywords: antitrust, Chicago School, New Institutional Economics, Roberts Court, Supreme Court, TCE, Transaction Cost Economics

JEL Classification: K21, L14, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Wright, Joshua D., The Chicago School, Transaction Cost Economics and the Roberts Court's Antitrust Jurisprudence (June 12, 2008). THE ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS, Peter G. Klein, Michael E. Sykuta, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-33. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1144883

Joshua D. Wright (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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