Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How?

34 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2008

See all articles by Eivind Stensholt

Eivind Stensholt

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science

Date Written: 2008-06-12

Abstract

Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a third and chanceless candidate in a 2-candidate race, and the possibility to win a 3-candidate election through different kinds of strategic voting. Here the focus is on the "burying" strategy in single-winner elections, where the win is obtained by ranking a main competitor artificially low. Condorcet methods are compared with the major alternatives (Borda Count, Approval Voting, Instant Runoff Voting). Various Condorcet methods are studied, and one method is proposed that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles where burying is possible.

Suggested Citation

Stensholt, Eivind, Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How? (2008-06-12). NHH Dept. of Finance & Management Science Discussion Paper No. 2008/11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1145304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1145304

Eivind Stensholt (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
55
Abstract Views
472
rank
380,371
PlumX Metrics