Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing

Abbott, Alden F.; Wright, Joshua D.

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Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37

ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming

34 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2008

See all articles by Alden F. Abbott

Alden F. Abbott

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical and empirical literatures.

Keywords: antitrust, bundling, competitive harm, empirical evidence, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, market power, monopolization, procompetitive efficiencies, tying

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L14, L41, L42

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Abbott, Alden F. and Wright, Joshua D., Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing. George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1145529