Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37

ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming

34 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2008

See all articles by Alden F. Abbott

Alden F. Abbott

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics

Abstract

This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical and empirical literatures.

Keywords: antitrust, bundling, competitive harm, empirical evidence, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, market power, monopolization, procompetitive efficiencies, tying

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L14, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Alden F. and Wright, Joshua D., Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing. George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1145529

Alden F. Abbott

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Joshua D. Wright (Contact Author)

Lodestar Law and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 751
Mclean, VA 22101
United States

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