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Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing


Alden F. Abbott


Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission

Joshua D. Wright


George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty


George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical and empirical literatures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: antitrust, bundling, competitive harm, empirical evidence, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, market power, monopolization, procompetitive efficiencies, tying

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L14, L41, L42


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Date posted: June 16, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Alden F. and Wright, Joshua D., Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing. George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37; ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1145529

Contact Information

Alden F. Abbott
Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission ( email )
600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States
Joshua D. Wright (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University Logo

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