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Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37

ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming

34 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2008  

Alden F. Abbott

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission

Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Abstract

This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical and empirical literatures.

Keywords: antitrust, bundling, competitive harm, empirical evidence, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts, market power, monopolization, procompetitive efficiencies, tying

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L14, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Abbott, Alden F. and Wright, Joshua D., Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing. George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-37; ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, Keith N. Hylton, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1145529

Alden F. Abbott

Government of the United States of America - Federal Trade Commission ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Joshua D. Wright (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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