Glass Ceilings or Sticky Floors? Statistical Discrimination in a Dynamic Model of Hiring and Promotion

22 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2008

See all articles by David Bjerk

David Bjerk

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

I show that when two groups differ in (i) their average skill level; (ii) the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market; and/or (iii) the frequency with which they have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, then even if firms become increasingly informed regarding each worker's skill over time, equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy, even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs.

Suggested Citation

Bjerk, David, Glass Ceilings or Sticky Floors? Statistical Discrimination in a Dynamic Model of Hiring and Promotion. Economic Journal, Vol. 118, Issue 530, pp. 961-982, July 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1147263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02157.x

David Bjerk (Contact Author)

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )

500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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