Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in Japan

29 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2008  

Rieko Ishii

Institute of Social and Economic Research

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation ofpotential outsiders. Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win to its members. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose winless period is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.

Keywords: Bid rigging, repeated auction

JEL Classification: D44, H57, L44

Suggested Citation

Ishii, Rieko, Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in Japan (March 2008). ISER Discussion Paper No. 710. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1148064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1148064

Rieko Ishii (Contact Author)

Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

1-1 Yamadaoka
Suita
Osaka, 565-0871
Japan

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