Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations

Posted: 26 Jun 2008

See all articles by Luc Laeven

Luc Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100% small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Keywords: G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Laeven, Luc A., Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (April 2008). Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 21, Issue 2, pp. 579-604, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1151590 or http://dx.doi.org/hhm068

Luc A. Laeven (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
524
PlumX Metrics