Cryptographic Commitment and Simultaneous Exchange

37 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2008 Last revised: 20 Dec 2008

See all articles by Peter Bardsley

Peter Bardsley

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics

Andrew P. Clausen

Edinburgh School of Economics

Vanessa Teague

University of Melbourne

Date Written: Dec 18, 2008

Abstract

Simultaneous exchange of valuable secrets is problematic without use of a trusted intermediary. Examples include trade between strangers involving the transfer of property rights at a distance by exchange of emails, and simultaneous signing of contracts. There is a danger that the first person to commit to the transaction will lose everything if the other party does not reciprocate. We study information exchange mechanisms that establish credible simultaneous commitment and implement individually rational exchange without using an intermediary.

Keywords: simultaneous exchange, trade in information, cryptographic cheap talk, incremental commitment

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bardsley, Peter and Clausen, Andrew P. and Teague, Vanessa, Cryptographic Commitment and Simultaneous Exchange (Dec 18, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1153162 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153162

Peter Bardsley (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia
+613 8344 6391 (Phone)
+613 8344 6899 (Fax)

Andrew P. Clausen

Edinburgh School of Economics ( email )

31 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh, EH8 9JT
United Kingdom
+441316515131 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://andrewclausen.net

Vanessa Teague

University of Melbourne ( email )

185 Pelham Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053
Australia

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