Optimal Central Bank Transparency

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-59

29 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2008

See all articles by Carin van der Cruijsen

Carin van der Cruijsen

De Nederlandsche Bank

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Lex Hoogduin

Bank of the Netherlands

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 30, 2008

Abstract

Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the optimum people might: (1) start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts, and/or (2) get confused by the large and increasing amount of information they receive. This deteriorates the (perceived) quality of private sector inflation forecasts. Inflation then is set in a more backward looking manner resulting in higher inflation persistence. By using a panel data set on the transparency of 100 central banks we find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized. Our results indicate that while there are central banks that would benefit from further transparency increases, some might already have reached the limit.

Keywords: central bank transparency, monetary policy, inflation persistence

JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

van der Cruijsen, Carin and Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. and Hoogduin, Lex, Optimal Central Bank Transparency (June 30, 2008). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-59. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1153325 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153325

Carin van der Cruijsen (Contact Author)

De Nederlandsche Bank ( email )

PO Box 98
1000 AB Amsterdam
Amsterdam, 1000 AB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.dnb.nl/en/onderzoek-2/onderzoekers/overzicht-persoonlijke-paginas/index.jsp

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2411 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Lex Hoogduin

Bank of the Netherlands ( email )

PO Box 98
1000 AB Amsterdam
Amsterdam, 1000 AB
Netherlands

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