Feedback, Punishment and Cooperation in Public-Good Experiments

University of Melbourne Dept. of Economics Research Paper No. 1036

31 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2008

See all articles by Nikos Nikiforakis

Nikos Nikiforakis

New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi

Date Written: April 18, 2008

Abstract

A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the efficacy of punishment. Providing subjects with information about the earnings of their peers leads to lower contributions and earnings compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contributions of their peers even though the feedback format does not affect incentives. The data suggest that this is because the feedback format acts as a coordination device, which influences the contribution standards that groups establish.

Keywords: feedback format, peer punishment, public good game, altruistic punishment

JEL Classification: C92, D70, H41

Suggested Citation

Nikiforakis, Nikos, Feedback, Punishment and Cooperation in Public-Good Experiments (April 18, 2008). University of Melbourne Dept. of Economics Research Paper No. 1036, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1153350 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153350

Nikos Nikiforakis (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/nnikiforakis/home

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