The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies

Law and Economics Handbook, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Stephen Shavel, eds., North Holland, 2007

165 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2008 Last revised: 11 Jun 2017

See all articles by McNollgast

McNollgast

Duke University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Political Science; Stanford University - Department of Economics

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

In the 1980s scholars began applying Positive Political Theory (PPT) to study public law. This chapter summarizes that body of research and its relationship to other schools of legal thought. Like Law and Economics, PPT of Law uses sequential game theory to examine how rules and procedures shape policy and evaluates these outcomes from the perspective of economic efficiency. Like the Legal Process School in traditional legal scholarship, PPT of Law focuses on how the structure and process of legislative, bureaucratic and judicial decision-making influences the law and evaluates these procedures using the principle of democratic legitimacy; however, rather than using procedural norms derived from moral and political philosophy to evaluate procedures, PPT of Law conceptualizes the decision-making procedures of government as rationally designed by elected officials to shape the policies arising from decisions by executive agencies, the courts, and future elected officials. After summarizing this theory, the essay turns to applications of this approach in administrative law and statutory interpretation.

Suggested Citation

McNollgast and McCubbins, Mathew D. and Noll, Roger G. and Weingast, Barry R., The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies (2007). Law and Economics Handbook, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Stephen Shavel, eds., North Holland, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1153479

McNollgast

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-2297 (Phone)
650-725-5702 (Fax)

Barry R. Weingast (Contact Author)

Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

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