Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium Party Hegemony in Mexico

41 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2008

See all articles by Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

Stanford University

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Date Written: April 2003

Abstract

Why do citizens acquiesce in regimes of which they obviously disapprove? We provide a model that exhibits a general mechanism underlying the survival of one-party dominant, authoritarian regimes. The "tragic brilliance" of one-party dominant systems is that the party employs a complex system of rewards and punishments that lead citizens to actively support the party. We study the long-standing hegemonic dominance in Mexican politics by the PRI. We model the PRI's credible threat to punish localities electing the opposition. We also explore our model's implications for the Mexican transition to democracy. Our empirical evidence at the municipal level supports the model. Our conclusions relate to the comparative literature on one party systems, elections, democratization and the political economy of Mexico.

Suggested Citation

Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto and Magaloni, Beatriz and Weingast, Barry R., Tragic Brilliance: Equilibrium Party Hegemony in Mexico (April 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1153510 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153510

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7481 (Phone)

Barry R. Weingast (Contact Author)

Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

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