Leaky Title Syndrome?

New Zealand Law Journal, pp. 115-120, April 2010

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 1193. (With the title "Electronic Titling: Potential and Risks").

22 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2010 Last revised: 22 Jul 2018

See all articles by Benito Arruñada

Benito Arruñada

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona GSE

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

Initiatives in electronic conveyancing and registration show the potential of new technologies to transform such systems, reducing costs and enhancing legal security. However, they also incur substantial risks of transferring costs and risks among registries, conveyancers and rightholders, instead of reducing them; entrenching the private interests of conveyancers, instead of increasing competition and disintermediating them; modifying the allocation of tasks in a way that leads in the long term to the debasement of registries of rights with indefeasible title into mere recordings of deeds; and empowering conveyancers instead of transactors and rightholders, which increases costs and reduces security. Fulfilling the promise of new technologies in both costs and security requires strengthening registries’ incentives and empowering rightholders in their interaction with registries.

Suggested Citation

Arruñada, Benito, Leaky Title Syndrome? (December 1, 2009). New Zealand Law Journal, pp. 115-120, April 2010, UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 1193. (With the title "Electronic Titling: Potential and Risks"). , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1154064

Benito Arruñada (Contact Author)

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Department of Economics and Business
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 25 72 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~arrunada

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

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