Download This PaperComparative Judicial Politics
28 Pages Posted: 1 Jul 2008
Date Written: October 2004
Abstract
It is hard to think of a political system that does not trumpet its commitment to "the rule of law," based on the principle that citizens are better off when the political system establishes rules for all to follow, rather than subjecting citizens either to arbitrary rule or to anarchy1. By entrusting the interpretation and enforcement of laws to legal specialists, the government agrees to abide by its own laws, and the courts can rule against the government to uphold the "laws of the land." Governments in most political systems are at least rhetorically deferential to this concept.
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John A. Ferejohn
NYU Law School ( email )
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New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
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