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Merger Policy to Promote 'Global Players'? A Simple Model

Posted: 2 Jul 2008  

Andreas Haufler

University of Munich - Seminar for Economic Policy; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Søren Bo Nielsen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2008

Abstract

We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyse under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we allow for multiple mergers and analyse whether national mergers, international mergers or no mergers will be the equilibrium market structure when the firms' decisions to merge are either taken non-cooperatively or cooperatively.

JEL Classification: L41, F13, H77

Suggested Citation

Haufler, Andreas and Nielsen, Søren Bo, Merger Policy to Promote 'Global Players'? A Simple Model (July 2008). Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 60, Issue 3, pp. 517-545, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1154402 or http://dx.doi.org/gpm046

Andreas Haufler (Contact Author)

University of Munich - Seminar for Economic Policy ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecpol.vwl.uni-muenchen.de

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Søren Bo Nielsen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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