Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions

Posted: 2 Jul 2008  

D. Roderick Kiewiet

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

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Date Written: August 1988

Abstract

We investigate the extent to which possessions of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regaurding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level contained appropriations process (fenno, 1966). We find strong support for this proposition in a regression presidential requests upon congressional appropriations decisions.

Suggested Citation

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D., Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions (August 1988). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1154658

D. Roderick Kiewiet (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626 395-4032 (Phone)

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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