When can Politicians Scare Citizens into Supporting Bad Policies? Strategy and Emotion in an Equilibrium of Fear

Posted: 2 Jul 2008

See all articles by Arthur Lupia

Arthur Lupia

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science

Jesse Menning

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

Analysts make competing claims about when and how politicians can use fear to gain support for suboptimal policies. Using a model, we clarify how common attributes of fear affect politicians' abilities to achieve self-serving outcomes that are bad for voters. In it, a politician provides information about a threat. His statement need not be true. How citizens respond differs from most game-theoretic models - we proceed from more dynamic (and realistic) assumptions about how citizens think. Our conclusions counter popular claims about how easily politicians use fear to manipulate citizens, yield different policy advice than does recent scholarship on counterterrorism, and highlight issues (abstract, distant) and leaders (secretive) for which recent findings by political psychologists and public opinion scholars will-and will not-generalize.

Suggested Citation

Lupia, Arthur and Menning, Jesse, When can Politicians Scare Citizens into Supporting Bad Policies? Strategy and Emotion in an Equilibrium of Fear. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1154665

Arthur Lupia (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Political Science ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-647-7549 (Phone)
734-764-3341 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: www.umich.edu/~lupia

Jesse Menning

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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