24 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2008 Last revised: 20 Nov 2012
Date Written: July 3, 2008
The organizational form of a competition agency affects its decision making. Functional organizations produce higher quality analysis but integrating the analysis into the decision-making process is more difficult than with a divisional form, organized around a specific sector or industry. This paper analyzes the tradeoff, with a particular focus on the role of economists in competition agencies around the world. We conclude that an effective functional organization requires strong horizontal links across the legal and economic bureaus and that an effective divisional organization requires separate economic and attorney recommendations, as well as managers who possess functional expertise in both economics and the law.
Keywords: Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Division, FTC, European Commission, Economists, Functional Organization, Divisional Organization
JEL Classification: L4, L2, M5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Froeb, Luke and Pautler, Paul A. and Röller, Lars-Hendrik, The Economics of Organizing Economists (July 3, 2008). Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1155237 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1155237