Forthcoming at Annales d'Economie et Statistique
25 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2008 Last revised: 6 Jun 2015
Date Written: May 30, 2012
We analyze the trade-off faced by authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is modeled as (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of scarce sites or any other non-reproducible assets. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms durably differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here is the policy that recognizes the fact that, under certain circumstances, helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.
Keywords: Competition policy, capacity accumulation, Cournot competition, asymmetric duopoly, regulatory consistency, differential games
JEL Classification: C73, L13, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Villeneuve, Bertrand and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua, Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action (May 30, 2012). Forthcoming at Annales d'Economie et Statistique . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1156164 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1156164