Does Partisan Alignment Affect the Electoral Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers?

36 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2008

See all articles by Albert Sole-Olle

Albert Sole-Olle

University of Barcelona; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

University of Barcelona - Faculty of Economic Science and Business Studies

Date Written: June 2008

Abstract

In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor.

Keywords: voting, parties, grants

JEL Classification: D72, H73

Suggested Citation

Sole-Olle, Albert and Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, Does Partisan Alignment Affect the Electoral Reward of Intergovernmental Transfers? (June 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2335. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1156271

Albert Sole-Olle (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

University of Barcelona - Faculty of Economic Science and Business Studies ( email )

Barcelona
Spain

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
101
Abstract Views
826
rank
271,438
PlumX Metrics