Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal

47 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2008

See all articles by Sofia Amaral-Garcia

Sofia Amaral-Garcia

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Veronica Grembi

Sapienza University of Rome - Department of Earth Sciences and Forecasting Research Center, Prevention and Control of Geological Risks

Date Written: July 7, 2008

Abstract

In this paper we test to what extent the Kelsenian-type of constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying of the Portuguese Constitutional Court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform that was enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.

Keywords: constitutional courts, judges, Portugal, empirical legal studies

JEL Classification: K0

Suggested Citation

Amaral-Garcia, Sofia and Garoupa, Nuno and Grembi, Veronica, Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal (July 7, 2008). U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1156281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1156281

Sofia Amaral-Garcia

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ( email )

CP 132 Av FD Roosevelt 50
Brussels, Brussels 1050
Belgium

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Veronica Grembi

Sapienza University of Rome - Department of Earth Sciences and Forecasting Research Center, Prevention and Control of Geological Risks ( email )

Rome
Italy

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