Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal

47 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2008

See all articles by Sofia Amaral-Garcia

Sofia Amaral-Garcia

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Veronica Grembi

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM)

Date Written: July 7, 2008

Abstract

In this paper we test to what extent the Kelsenian-type of constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying of the Portuguese Constitutional Court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform that was enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.

Keywords: constitutional courts, judges, Portugal, empirical legal studies

JEL Classification: K0

Suggested Citation

Amaral-Garcia, Sofia and Garoupa, Nuno and Grembi, Veronica, Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal (July 7, 2008). U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-21. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1156281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1156281

Sofia Amaral-Garcia

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstra├če 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Veronica Grembi

University of Milan - Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods (DEMM) ( email )

Via Conservatorio, 7
Milan, 20122
Italy

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