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Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress

Posted: 7 Jul 2008  

D. Roderick Kiewiet

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Date Written: May 1985

Abstract

In this essay we model appropriations decisions as products of a bilateral bargaining game between reelection-minded president and Congress. The findings bear out the expectaion that the two sides jointly puruse a strategy of accomodation. In awarding appropriations, Congress takes into account the president's preferences embodied in the OMB's budget requests; these requests in turn reflected expectations of congressional action. The evidence also reveals that several important exogenous political and economic variables influence bith executive and legislative appropriations decisions.

Suggested Citation

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D., Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress (May 1985). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1156468

D. Roderick Kiewiet (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626 395-4032 (Phone)

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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