Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests

25 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2008

See all articles by Wolfgang Leininger

Wolfgang Leininger

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: July 3, 2008

Abstract

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby "rationalizing" the more aggressive behavior.

Keywords: contests, preference evolution, evolutionary stability

JEL Classification: C79, D72

Suggested Citation

Leininger, Wolfgang, Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests (July 3, 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2343, Ruhr Economic Paper No. 49, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1156755

Wolfgang Leininger (Contact Author)

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics ( email )

D-44221 Dortmund
Germany
+49 231 755 3297 (Phone)
+49 231 755 3027 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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