The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims

39 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2008 Last revised: 13 Aug 2017

See all articles by Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Erik Hovenkamp

Cornell University - Law School

Date Written: March 25, 2009


A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm "squeezes' a rival's margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival, and a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with Judge Hand's famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a "fairness" or "fair profit" test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually adopted a cost-based test, although a somewhat different one than most courts and scholars would adopt today. We conclude that strictly cost-based predatory pricing tests such as the one the Supreme Court developed in its 1993 Brooke Group decision are not appropriate to the concerns being raised in a price squeeze. We also consider several efficiency explanations, the importance of joint costs, situations in which the dominant firm uses a squeeze to appropriate the fixed cost portion of the rival's investment, as well as those where the shared input is a fixed rather than variable cost for the rival. Ultimately, we find little room for antitrust liability except in one circumstance: where a squeeze is used to restrain the rival's vertical integration into the monopolized market.

Keywords: Antitrust, Monopoly, Sherman Act, Price Squeeze, Predatory Pricing, Linkline

JEL Classification: K0, K2, K21, L40, L41

Suggested Citation

Hovenkamp, Herbert and Hovenkamp, Erik, The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims (March 25, 2009). Arizona Law Review, Vol. 50, p. 967, 2008, U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-33, Available at SSRN: or

Herbert Hovenkamp (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
319-512-9579 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Erik Hovenkamp

Cornell University - Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

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