Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help

45 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2008 Last revised: 23 Jan 2009

See all articles by Francesca Gino

Francesca Gino

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Lamar Pierce

Washington University, Saint Louis - John M. Olin School of Business

Date Written: January 6, 2009

Abstract

This paper investigates whether an employee's perception of customer wealth affects their likelihood of engaging in illegal behavior. We propose that envy and empathy lead employees to discriminate in illicitly helping customers based on customer wealth. We test for this hypothesis in the vehicle emissions testing market, where employees have the opportunity to illegally help customers by passing vehicles that would otherwise fail emissions tests. We find that for a significant number of inspectors, leniency is much higher for those customers with standard vehicles than for those with luxury cars, while a smaller group appears to favor wealthy drivers. We also investigate the psychological mechanisms explaining this wealth-based discriminatory behavior using a laboratory study. Our experiment shows that individuals are more willing to illegally help peers when those peers drive standard rather than luxury cars and that envy and empathy mediate this effect. Collectively, our results suggest the presence of wealth-based discrimination in employee-customer relations, and that envy toward wealthy customers and empathy toward those of similar economic status drive much of this illegal behavior. Implications for both theory and practice are discussed.

Keywords: Unethical behavior; Empathy; Envy; Fraud; Robin-Hood; Wealth-based discrimination

Suggested Citation

Gino, Francesca and Pierce, Lamar, Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help (January 6, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1157083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1157083

Francesca Gino

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Lamar Pierce (Contact Author)

Washington University, Saint Louis - John M. Olin School of Business ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
314-935-5205 (Phone)

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