Neo-Madisonian Theory and Latin American Institutions

In REGIMES AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, Gerardo Munck, (ed.)

48 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2009

See all articles by Royce Carroll

Royce Carroll

University of Essex - Department of Government; Rice University - Department of Political Science

Matthew Soberg Shugart

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS)

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

In this essay, we describe a conceptual framework for analyzing political institutions and party systems that we brand 'neo-Madisonian'. Neo-Madisonian theory integrates formal constitutional structure with an understanding of the incentives and context facing the actors charged with working within that structure. Using examples from Latin American presidential regimes, we argue that a neo-Madisonian approach has particularly contributed to our understanding of key features of political institutions, particularly the interaction between the separation of powers, delegation in democratic representation, and collective action among political actors.

Keywords: constitutional design, electoral systems, presidential regimes, political parties, Latin American politics

Suggested Citation

Carroll, Royce and Shugart, Matthew Soberg, Neo-Madisonian Theory and Latin American Institutions (2007). In REGIMES AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, Gerardo Munck, (ed.). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1157525

Royce Carroll (Contact Author)

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Rice University - Department of Political Science ( email )

MS-24
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77251-1892
United States
713-348-2103 (Phone)
772-264-8530 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://rcarroll.web.rice.edu

Matthew Soberg Shugart

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IRPS) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States
858-534-5016 (Phone)
858-534-3939 (Fax)

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