The Ties that Bind: Social Networks, Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention

Posted: 10 Jul 2008

See all articles by Donald P. Moynihan

Donald P. Moynihan

Georgetown University - McCourt School of Public Policy

Sanjay K. Pandey

George Washington University - Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

This article examines the influence of social networks and value congruence on turnover intention among public and nonprofit employees. We argue that employees exist in social networks inside and outside their organization, and these networks shape employee attitudes and behavior. To illustrate this theory, we use turnover intention. A strong and positive intraorganizational social network characterized by good relations with and a sense of obligation toward other staff is hypothesized to make it more likely that employees will stay. A strong social network external to the organization is hypothesized to increase the opportunities that employees have to leave. Our findings offer strong support for the role of intraorganizational networks, but relatively weak support for the effect of external networks. We also propose that person-organization (P-O) fit shape turnover intention. Our results suggest that employees who experience a strong P-O fit in terms of value congruence are more likely to offer a long-term commitment.

Suggested Citation

Moynihan, Donald P. and Pandey, Sanjay K., The Ties that Bind: Social Networks, Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention (April 2008). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 18, Issue 2, pp. 205-227, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1157660 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum013

Donald P. Moynihan (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - McCourt School of Public Policy ( email )

Old North, Suite 100
37th & O Streets NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States

Sanjay K. Pandey

George Washington University - Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration ( email )

805 21st Street, NW
Suite 601
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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