Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Harnessing Success: Determinants of University Technology Licensing Performance

45 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2008  

Sharon Belenzon

Duke University; NBER; Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Mark A. Schankerman

London School of Economics and Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and government constraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contracting model of technology licensing offices, using new survey information together with panel data on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find that private universities are much more likely to adopt incentive pay than public ones, but ownership does not affect licensing performance conditional on the use of incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associated with about 30-40 percent more income per license. Universities with strong local development objectives generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are more likely to license to local (in-state) startup companies. Stronger government constraints are 'costly' in terms of foregone license income and startup activity. These results are robust to controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.

JEL Classification: O31, O32, O33, F23

Suggested Citation

Belenzon, Sharon and Schankerman, Mark A., Harnessing Success: Determinants of University Technology Licensing Performance (February 2007). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI44. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1158321

Sharon Belenzon

Duke University ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(1) 617 588 1484 (Phone)

Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative ( email )

215 Morris St., Suite 300
Durham, NC 27701
United States

Mark A. Schankerman

London School of Economics and Political Science ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 7518 (Phone)
+44 20 7831 1840 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Paper statistics

Downloads
45
Abstract Views
542