Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation

16 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2008

See all articles by Franz Dietrich

Franz Dietrich

Paris School of Economics & CNRS; University of East Anglia (UEA)

Christian List

London School of Economics

Date Written: October 2005


In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op- posite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.

JEL Classification: D70, D71

Suggested Citation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian, Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation (October 2005). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. PEPP13. Available at SSRN:

Franz Dietrich (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics & CNRS ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014


University of East Anglia (UEA)

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

Christian List

London School of Economics ( email )

United Kingdom

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