Mobilization, Social Networks, and Turnout: Evidence from Japan

47 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2008

See all articles by Gary W. Cox

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University

Frances McCall Rosenbluth

Yale University - Department of Political Science

Michael F. Thies

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 1998

Abstract

The strategic elites model of turnout argues that elites mobilize more when the probability of their effort deciding the electoral outcome is greater. Although the literature assumes that this probability depends solely on how close the election is, logically it depends jointly on how many votes are needed to affect the outcome (closeness) and on how many additional votes elite efforts are likely to garner (vote yield). Because the vote yield of mobilizational effort varies with the social capital of the district that elites face, the level of elite mobilizational effort (hence turnout) should depend interactively on closeness and social capital. We test our predictions using data from Japanese lower house elections 1967-90. Japan is an interesting test case both because its (former) electoral system differs from that for which the model was first developed and because the literature clearly stresses the role of elite mobilization through social networks but does not examine the particular hypotheses advanced here.

Suggested Citation

Cox, Gary W. and Rosenbluth, Frances McCall and Thies, Michael F., Mobilization, Social Networks, and Turnout: Evidence from Japan (1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1158651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1158651

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)

Frances McCall Rosenbluth

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States
203-432-5256 (Phone)

Michael F. Thies (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Political Science ( email )

405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
United States
310-825-1976 (Phone)
310-825-0778 (Fax)

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