Heterogeneity of Southern Countries and Southern Intellectual Property Rights Policy

32 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2008

See all articles by Jeong-Eon Kim

Jeong-Eon Kim

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Harvey E. Lapan

Iowa State University - Department of Economics

Abstract

We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.

Suggested Citation

Kim, Jeong-Eon and Lapan, Harvey E., Heterogeneity of Southern Countries and Southern Intellectual Property Rights Policy. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, Vol. 41, Issue 3, pp. 894-925, August/août 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1158671 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00490.x

Jeong-Eon Kim (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Harvey E. Lapan

Iowa State University - Department of Economics ( email )

260 Heady Hall
Ames, IA 50011
United States
515 294-5917 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
413
PlumX Metrics