32 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2008
This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Harrington, Joseph E., Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs. The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 215-246, June 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1158748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00339.x
By Robert Lande
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