Rationalism About Obligation

39 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2008

Date Written: July 12, 2008


This paper considers whether having an obligation to do something involves having a special kind of reason to do it. I focus on those obligations which arise from the exercise of normative powers e.g. commands and promises. Various theories of obligation are examined, particularly that of Joseph Raz. I conclude that rationalism fails, at least with respect to promissory obligation.

Suggested Citation

Owens, David, Rationalism About Obligation (July 12, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1159183 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1159183

David Owens (Contact Author)

Kings College London ( email )

Philosophy Building
The Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://davidowensphilosophy.wordpress.com/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics