Entry, Product Line Expansion, and Predation

Posted: 14 Jul 2008

See all articles by Vincenzo Denicolò

Vincenzo Denicolò

University of Bologna

Michele Polo

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Piercarlo Zanchettin

University of Leicester

Abstract

In the Tourist-Caronte case in Italy, the incumbent, Tourist-Caronte, reacted to entry by entrant Diano by starting to supply a damaged good in the sense theorized by Deneckere and McAfee in 1996. We argue that in principle this strategy can be predatory, but it can also be an innocent response to entry. Specifically, the strategy of damaging the good leads to fiercer competition in the low segment of the market, which reduces the rents that the incumbent earns in the high segment, but may allow the incumbent to steal some of the entrant's rents. If this business stealing effect in the low segment of the market is sufficiently strong, the incumbent may find it profitable to expand its product line after entry, even if it does not have any predatory intent. We discuss the welfare effects of this strategy, and we contrast it with predation.

Suggested Citation

Denicolo, Vincenzo and Polo, Michele and Zanchettin, Piercarlo, Entry, Product Line Expansion, and Predation. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 4, pp. 609-624, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1159265 or http://dx.doi.org/nhm013

Vincenzo Denicolo (Contact Author)

University of Bologna ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Michele Polo

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Piercarlo Zanchettin

University of Leicester ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester, LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

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