Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive EU Cartel Policy

Posted: 14 Jul 2008

See all articles by Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick

Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick

E.CA Economics; ESMT European School of Management and Technology

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics; IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2008

Abstract

The implementation of leniency programs is considered a success both at a EU Community level and in individual member states. The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations for cartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases. Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competition authority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on the prosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow a proactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigations triggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcement tool to the other passive instruments available to a competition authority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspections based on economic criteria is presented allowing for a more proactive cartel policy.

Suggested Citation

Friederiszick, Hans Wolfgang and Maier-Rigaud, Frank P., Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive EU Cartel Policy (March 2008). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1159275 or http://dx.doi.org/nhm024

Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick (Contact Author)

E.CA Economics ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.e-ca.com/our-team/#hans-w-friederiszick

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://faculty-research.esmt.berlin/person/hans-w-friederiszick/bio

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

ABC economics ( email )

Berlin, 10115
Germany
10115 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ABCecon.com

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

Socle de la Grande Arche
1 Parvis de la Défense
Paris, La Défense Cedex, 92044
France

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