Of Coalition and Speed: Passage and Duration of Statutes in Uruguay's Parliament, 1985-2000

IBEI Working Papers

33 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2008

See all articles by Eric Magar

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Juan Andrés Moraes

Universidad de la Republica

Date Written: July, 14 2008

Abstract

We report preliminary findings from analysis of a database under construction. The paper explores the legislative process in search for some of the alleged consequences of cabinet coalitions in a presidential system. Coalition effects should be less evident in the success of executive initiatives: strategic behavior hampers this intuitive measure of performance. Better measures, because less subject to strategic considerations, are the odds of passage of legislators' bills and the time proposals take to be approved. Thus measured, coalition effects are discernible. Analysis of the universe of proposals processed in the fragmented Uruguayan Parliament between 1985 and 2000 reveals that coalition, observed about half the period, swells success rates of coalition members by 60% on average (and by as much as 150% for those close to the president). Event history analysis shows that coalitions cut the wait for an executive bill by 3 months, 1/6th the average wait. The reverse effect is felt on the duration of legislators' bills.

Keywords: Presidential Democracy, Coalition, Legislation, Duration Analysis, Uruguay

Suggested Citation

Magar, Eric and Moraes, Juan Andrés, Of Coalition and Speed: Passage and Duration of Statutes in Uruguay's Parliament, 1985-2000 (July, 14 2008). IBEI Working Papers, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1159621 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1159621

Eric Magar (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

Juan Andrés Moraes

Universidad de la Republica ( email )

Constituyente 1502
Montevideo, 11200
Uruguay

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