Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

52 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2008

See all articles by Oliver Hart

Oliver Hart

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

John Moore

University of Edinburgh - Economics; London School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1998

Abstract

In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting'. However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

JEL Classification: D20, D80, H11, H70, L22, P11

Suggested Citation

Hart, Oliver D. and Moore, John Hardman, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (September 1998). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE358, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1160961

Oliver D. Hart (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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John Hardman Moore

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