Endogenous Lobbying

37 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2008

See all articles by Leonardo Felli

Leonardo Felli

University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2003

Abstract

In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

JEL Classification: D20, D80, H11, H70, L22, P11

Suggested Citation

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio M., Endogenous Lobbying (February 2003). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE448, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1160992

Leonardo Felli (Contact Author)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Antonio M. Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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