Endogenous Lobbying
37 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2008
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Endogenous Lobbying
Date Written: February 2003
Abstract
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.
JEL Classification: D20, D80, H11, H70, L22, P11
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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