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Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?

Transparency in Litigation, UCLA-Rand, Forthcoming

UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-15

28 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2008 Last revised: 28 Sep 2008

Stephen C. Yeazell

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: July 16, 2008

Abstract

Settlements of civil lawsuits constitute a large market whose functioning affects economic and social life. At present this market operates with poor pricing information - far less than is available in any comparably important market in the United States. After describing why we lack good pricing information for civil settlements and the existence of much better information in comparable markets, the article goes on to describe a mechanism that would make reliable settlement prices widely available with minimum disruption to existing practices.

Suggested Citation

Yeazell, Stephen C., Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits? (July 16, 2008). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-15; UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161343

Stephen Yeazell (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951476 P.O. Box 951476
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-825-8404 (Phone)
310-206-0158 (Fax)

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