Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral

Posted: 17 Jul 2008

See all articles by Andrei Marmor

Andrei Marmor

Cornell University - Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

It has become increasingly popular to argue that legal positivism is actually a normative theory, and that it cannot be purely descriptive and morally neutral as H.L.A. Hart has suggested. This article purports to disprove this line of thought. It argues that legal positivism is best understood as a descriptive, morally neutral, theory about the nature of law. The article distinguishes between five possible views about the relations between normative claims and legal positivism, arguing that some of them are not at odds with Hart's thesis about the nature of jurisprudence, while the others are wrong, both as expositions of legal positivism or as critiques of it. Legal positivism does not necessarily purport to justify any aspect of its subject matter, nor is it committed to any particular moral or political evaluations.

Suggested Citation

Marmor, Andrei, Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral ( 2006). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, Issue 4, pp. 683-704, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqi028

Andrei Marmor (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio_andrei_marmor.cfm

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
801
PlumX Metrics