Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a Collusive Function?

Robert Day School of Economics and Finance Research Paper No. 2009-12

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich Working Paper No. 448

37 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2008

See all articles by Michelle Sovinsky Goeree

Michelle Sovinsky Goeree

University of Southern California

Eric Helland

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; RAND

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility that firms may form RJVs to facilitate collusion. We exploit variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects the collusive benefits but not the research synergies associated with an RJV. We estimate an RJV participation equation and find the decision to join is impacted by the policy change. Our results are consistent with research joint ventures serving a collusive function.

Keywords: research and development, research joint ventures, antitrust policy

JEL Classification: L24, L44, K21, O32

Suggested Citation

Goeree, Michelle Sovinsky and Helland, Eric A., Do Research Joint Ventures Serve a Collusive Function? (2009). Robert Day School of Economics and Finance Research Paper No. 2009-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1163268 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1163268

Michelle Sovinsky Goeree (Contact Author)

University of Southern California ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Eric A. Helland

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )

500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States
909-607-7275 (Phone)
909-621-8243 (Fax)

RAND ( email )

1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
156
Abstract Views
1,070
rank
196,423
PlumX Metrics