Chinese Walls in Large Financial and Market Institutions: Experiences and Lessons from Common Law Jurisdictions

Tsinghua Law Review (Qinghua Faxue), Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 149-159, 2007

12 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2008 Last revised: 28 Aug 2016

See all articles by (Robin) Hui Huang

(Robin) Hui Huang

Chinese University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law; 华东政法大学(East China University of Political Sicence and Law); University of New South Wales - Faculty of Law

Date Written: July 24, 2008

Abstract

Modern professional financial organizations have been inevitably subject to conflict of interest problems. The emergence of the Chinese Wall has been an innovation which has provided a convenient, if not an always successful, solution to these problems. Chinese Walls are designed to attain a balancing of public confidence in the advisory professions against the commercial needs of those professions to operate as larger entities in a cost-effective way. The attitudes towards Chinese Walls vary from country to country, depending on the level of the balancing. Experience in the relevant industries, however, has cast significant doubt on the effectiveness of Chinese Walls, suggesting that the current Chinese Walls are far from ideal, and there is a need for an array of reinforcement mechanisms which have yet to be adequately developed.

Note: Downloadable document is in Chinese.

Keywords: Chinese Wall, Financial institution, Market intermediary, Conflicts of interest

JEL Classification: K22, K33

Suggested Citation

Huang, (Robin) Hui, Chinese Walls in Large Financial and Market Institutions: Experiences and Lessons from Common Law Jurisdictions (July 24, 2008). Tsinghua Law Review (Qinghua Faxue), Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 149-159, 2007 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1173502

(Robin) Hui Huang (Contact Author)

Chinese University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Shatin, New Territories
Hong Kong
852-39431805 (Phone)
852-29942505 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.cuhk.edu.hk/people/huang-hui-robin.php

华东政法大学(East China University of Political Sicence and Law) ( email )

1575 Wanhangdu Rd.
Changning, Shanghai 200042
China

University of New South Wales - Faculty of Law ( email )

Sydney, New South Wales 2052
Australia
61-2-9385 9649 (Phone)
61-2-9385 1175 (Fax)

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