Intellectual Property and Market Size

Posted: 25 Jul 2008

See all articles by Michele Boldrin

Michele Boldrin

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Date Written: March 2005

Abstract

Intellectual property protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. As the scale of the market increases, due either to economic and population growth or to the expansion of trade through treaties such as the World Trade Organization, this trade-off changes. We show that, generally speaking, the socially optimal amount of protection decreases as the scale of the market increases. We also provide simple empirical estimates of how much it should decrease.

Keywords: Intellectual Property, International Trade, Innovation, Harmonization, Monopoly

JEL Classification: X15, X16

Suggested Citation

Boldrin, Michele and Levine, David K., Intellectual Property and Market Size (March 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1174423

Michele Boldrin (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )

271 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-4551 (Phone)
612-624-0209 (Fax)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
374
PlumX Metrics